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Honorable David Roberti
Chairman
Senate Rules Committee
Room 400, State Capitol
Dear Senator Roberti:
The Senate Advisory Commission on Cost Control in State
Government herewith transmits its third report to the Senate
Rules Committee -- a report on The state's Regulation of
Financial Institutions.
This study was undertaken by a subcommittee of the Commission
chaired by M. Larry Lawrence. The work of the Subcommittee was
reviewed and approved by the Commission at its last meeting.
Members of the Subcommittee were Jerry Aspland, Carl Blomquist,
and
Creaser. The Commission wishes to express its gratitude
to John B. McNeece III and A. Vincent s
iano, pro bono
consultants to the Commission, for their contributions to the
research and preparation of this report. In addition, the
ion
to thank Elisabeth Kersten,
Olsan,
Richard Damm and Jason Warburg of the Senate Office of Research
for their assistance in producing the report.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Banks and savings and loans have failed at an unprecedented
rate over the past five years. The recent upheavals in the
financial services industry are seen by some as threatening the
stability of our entire financial system.
In order to minimize
the adverse effects of these upheavals on Cali
, the State
needs to take on an aggressive reform program a
at
strengthening the supervisory abilities of our financ
regulatory agencies.
over the past decade there has been substantial
deregulation of the financial services industry and changes
the financial services business, factors which
increasing competitive pressure on banks and
In addition, the large number of institutional
over the
past few years has created major problems for the federal
insurance funds and the industry as a whole. The Commiss
believes that the time has come to evaluate whether banks and
savings and loans have too many powers.
It is apparent that
deregulation has invited abuses and mismanagement. The
Legislature should review its deregulatory actions and determine
whether the law should be changed. This decision should be
based on what is good for the citizens .of California, not the
preferences of the industry.
The significant changes that have taken place in the
financial industry in recent years have made the supervision of
financial institutions both more important and more difficult.
The State needs to take steps to improve the supervisory
capabilities of the Departments of Banking and Savings and Loan.
state Banking Department
As of February 1988, the State Banking
was responsible for supervising 389 institutions and a total of $265
billion in assets. The Department has
meeting its
objectives known as 11
and has a sound set of goals under that
Nevertheless, 37%
of the banks
ated by the
suf
ient
trouble to be
aced on the Department's "
recommendations of the Commission with
Department, discussed in detail in the body of the report, are
summarized below:
•

That the Legislature and the Department re-evaluate whether
the Department's existing resources allow it to adequately
supervise its licensees;

•

That the Department take a number of
to
recent findings that the principal causes for bank failure
are fraud and misconduct;

1

the
•

That the Department examine all licensee
least once a year, and institutions
"troubled" every six months;

at

and the Department cons
means of providing sal
and
to
examiners and supervisory staff comparable to private
sector equivalents;
•

That the
ful
implement
the Department of Personnel Administrat
improving examiner salaries and benefits,
additional authority from DPA for filling and reclassifying
certain examiner classes, and reassess whether
career
counseling program is meeting the needs of its employees;

•

That the Legislature provide to the Department a $100,000
appropriation to increase examiner training which was cut
from the 1988-89 budget; and
That the Department conduct a thorough
of
sources of information and negotiate greater access to
federal information sources.

Department of Savings and Loan
As of the close of 1987, the Department of Savings and Loan
supervised 137 state-chartered savings and loans with $147.9
billion in assets. The Department does not have an
1
strategy for its regulatory program and appears to have an
number of
in 1
of the
had to
under some s
But
the s
The
and
below:
That,
as the current
of the
assessing funds from the Savings and Loans
is fundamentally flawed, the
's funding mechanism,
assessments to support the
the General Fund
flexibility and the possib ity of General
supplementing assessment proceeds, or by some other method
such as franchise tax offsets;
2

•

That the Department develop an
the lines of the Banking Department's

e

That the Legislature and the Department create and fully
staff a fraud unit within the Department, as recommended to
the Banking Department above;

•

That the Department examine all licensee institutions at
least once a year, and institutions it designates as
troubled" every six months;

e

That the Legislature further shield the the Savings and
Loan Commissioner from political pressures by changing the
office from a pleasure appointment to a term appointment
removable only for serious cause;

•

That the Department carry out joint examinations with the
Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco where the
Department focuses on operating areas unique to California
institutions;

e

That the Department adopt personnel reforms similar to
those recommended for the Banking Department above in the
areas of hiring, compensation, training and career
counseling; and

e

That the Department seek out additional information
sources, as recommended to the Banking Department above.

The Commission does not believe that a recommendation to
consolidate the State's financial regulatory functions into a
"Department of Financial Institutions" is warranted at this
time. While the idea deserves further study, at present there
are substantial differences in the Departments of Banking and
Savings and Loan's regulatory structures, and in the way each
uses and trains examiners.
Finally, based on the experience in
other states, the administrative cost savings potential of
consolidation does not appear to justi
such a recommendation
at this time.
Nevertheless, the entire area of
of
institutions should have a higher profile
state government.
The Governor and his administration must make
a high
priority and assure that energy and resources are focused on the
very serious problems outlined in this report.

3

PREFACE
The Senate Advisory Commission on Cost
State
Government was created by Senate Resolution
f
1984)
to study, analyze, and make recommendations on cost control
state government. SR 40 directed the Commission to look for
ways to increase efficiency, reduce costs, enhance
administrative accountability and control, and
program management techniques and systems to state
Like the federal Grace Commission, the Commission has been
directed by SR 40 to forge private and public sector efforts to
control the costs of and increase the efficiency of government.
The mission statement adopted by the
defines project selection criteria: the
potentially effect improvements in multiple agencies ... " and
11
improve services and I or programs permitting them to operate
more effectively within existing resource levels."
With these goals in mind, the Commission selected
1s
topic of analysis the regulation of Cali
institutions.
The Commission is indebted to John B. McNeece III and A.
Vincent Siciliano for the many hours of toil and effort
they donated to the Senate in working on this project.
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AND

1

of their
is
and loan area,
for
of abating.
the amount
l have to
out
ing S & Ls throughout the country
the numerous
continue to rise, ranging from $20 billion to as high as $85
l

l

But federal
the
consequences of
The
regulators in Cali
the federal level,
to
and correct the
the regulatory
the failures to occur in the first place. The State
must
the future and determine how it can improve the
regulatory institutions to lessen the
of
s
the financial industry.
There
much at stake for Cali
to isolate and solve these problems. According to the State's Department of
, 37% of the banks chartered in California as of
March 1988 were judged to be in less than satisfactory financial
condition, with about 17% in serious trouble. The Department of
and Loan reported that 42% of the examinations conducted
during the 1986-87 fiscal year were considered
em" exams. For 1986 and 1987, failures by California s &
almost 30% of the total national S & L failures.2
The recent bailout and merger of American Savings and Loan of
Stockton alone cost $2 billion, and the institution is still far
from being out of trouble.
called for.

of

resources to cope
face
the future.

1

2 State Departments of Banking and Savings and Loan; FSLIC.
5

offer
capabilities
or theme in
of financial institutions
t)he
a
system carries a public or
responsibility"
idates "a government role in
the system. 11 3
institutions within the
of the State
Department and the Department
of Savings and Loan
an enormous
on the economy of
California. As of February B, 1988, the State Banking
Department was
for
ing 280 state-chartered
banks with $92 bil ion in
, 100 foreign banking
corporations with $66 bill
assets, and 19 trust companies
within supervised banks
$107 billion in fiduciary
assets.4 As of December 31, 1987, the Department of Savings and
Loan supervised 137
savings and loans with
$147.9 billion in assets 5
or respons
lity of the two
departments is to protect
and soundness of the
financial institutions
respective jurisdictions.
This serves to protect
from losses due to institutional failures, and
the entire financial system.
11

The Commission
State and the publ
agencies
Department of Savings
answer, but it is

over the long run, costs to
reduced by strengthening state
State
Department and the
is by no means the entire
step.

changes in the current
the state's financial
However
the severity of the
current situation
demands that the Legislature
evaluate whether financial institutions in California have too
expansion of powers the
It is
years has invited
abuses and mismanagement
should review current law

3 Henry Kaufman,
Brothers, Speech
Senate Committ•'e on Banking, July 1987.

to

The

u.s.

4 Howard
i
Superintendent of Banks,
"Background Paper on The Operations of The State Banking
Department," February 8, 1988.
5 Letter, Department of Savings and Loan to The Commission,
February 18, 1988.

6

of

7

ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

study
1
present a statement of the context in
the State Banking Department and the Department of Savings
carry out their supervisory function. This
or regulatory changes over the past decade,
changes within the financial services industry, and
large numbers of institutional failures. These factors make
supervisory function increasingly important, yet at the same
time increasingly
fficult. The study then reviews the
operations of the State Banking Department and the Department of
Savings and Loans and provides a number of strong
recommendations for enhancing
supervisory capabilities of
these Departments. The study closes with comments concerning the
possible consolidation of the two departments.

8

there have been
affect
financ
bus
There have also been a
failures
have created major
funds and for the financial
These changes have made the
State Banking Department and the
Loan much more important, but also

passed in the 1930s, augmented by restraints
the federal regulatory authorities, established a
competition among financial institutions,
{l) limitations on deposit interest rates, (2)
restrictions on the financial products that banks and savings
and
could offer, and (3) geographical restrictions. Under
the
technological change and competition from
,
regulatory regime began to erode in
crumbled more rapidly in the 1970's and 1980's.6

gave the Federal Reserve the authority to
ceilings on time and savings depos
These
gave financial institutions a protected
source of funding. When high inflation in the
70's and the
1980's led to double-digit interest
above the
ings, securities firms and insurance
to offer investment vehicles which paid market
served as alternatives to
order

under pressure from these
smantle the rate ceil
In
ation and
Control

What Should Banks Do?,
19
. 34.
9

Brookings

ished
)

f

1986.
Institutions
directed the DIDC
, which it
accounts ( 11 MMDAs 11 )
effective
, and successfully

While the
itory
products and to
cost of funds
previously been
institutions to f
above the cost of
substantial
because of their
mortgages.

lowed
new investment
base, it also raised
which had
for financial
rates of return
particular, were
on assets
rate fixed
difficulties
the
to

In 1980,
state
assets in
cards, and make

consumer
,
second mortgages.

1982, Congress authorized
more consumer loans, make
own property to lease,

limited

B D. Kidwell, R Peterson, Financial Institutions,
and Money, 1984, at p. 281
9 Ibid. at 462.
10 Ibid. at 281

282.
10

Markets

and

new law,

other
were not regulated by a state
observers felt that this added up
loans into fundamentally different
than
had been when the
was created.
result of
of the law was that
and loans increased from 106
1982 to the current level of 137 associations.l3
some power to expand products through the
Act of 1982, which gave banks more power to
14 National banks and aff iates of bank
also obtained some add ional powers through
administrative interpretations promulgated by
ler of the Currency and the Federal Reserve
industry has made a concerted effort to expand
participate in the securities business. The
been the Glass-Steagall Act, a law
1933 in
and the
favorable interpretations from the
and the Federal Reserve Board,
courts, bank affiliates have been permitted to
brokerage, private placement of commercial
debt), and the underwrit
of
, consumer
ect to

of

9.

What Should Banks Do?, at p. 51-54.
ll

and

banking
western
, on

the
to
interest
would
, that the
the interests
, and that
leave
the
has
had

to offer a much
in order
rema
ive
At the same time,
ation has put the financ
services industry under competitive pressure which it did not
face before. We can make two conclusions about deregulation:
(1)
It has blurred the traditional institutional lines between
banks, savings and loans, and other financial service providers.
(2)
It has allowed industry competition to increase.
one consequence of the increased competition is
1
that many banks and savings and loans have undertaken
questionable actions to increase profits or simply to maintain
solvency. A recent congressional study found that misconduct
caused or contributed to "at least one-third (and probably more)
of commercial bank failures and over three-quarters of all S&L
insolvencies.l6 Deregulation has clearly
to
development by making it easier for financial institutions to
get into trouble, whether through mismanagement or outright
fraud.
2. BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BANKING AND SAVINGS AND LOAN
INDUSTRIES

Banks have come under significant pressure as a result of
competition from other financial service providers.
For
example, banks have lost a significant portion of traditional
short and medium term business lending to the securities
markets. To a significant extent, the issuance of commercial
paper and other securities has taken the place of commercial
bank borrowing for major businesses.l7 The decline in lending
opportunities has caused banks, in some instances, to lend to
more risky enterprises. It has also put banks under pressure to
expand their product offerings and to expand geographically in
order to make up for lost lending. Riskier lending and new
products, if not properly managed, can increase the general risk
level for banks, raising safety and soundness concerns.
More
, banks are now fac
from
non-banking and even non-f
ial firms.
Lynch and
-Bache, for
and investment
,
le the finance
subs
of such companies as General Motors and General
in resident
f
Reflect
Electric are
competition, commercial banks' percentage of all assets held by

16 "Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct
the Nation's
Financial Institutions: Current Federal Efforts are Inadequate;"
Report of the Committee on Government
of the u.s.
House of Representatives; October 13, 1988; p. 10.
17 R. Litan, What Should Banks Do?, at pp. 42-43.
13

more
liabilities,
requires a
who do not

and
and

3

volume of

18
19 See
Trends
June 1987 (

4

1977

Industry,
through

the late
s to 11.3
a
number of bank

1985.2

There have

The savings and loan business has been even harder hit,
because of the dead or dying port
of the business.
, July 22, 1988, the media reported that the nation's
savings and loans lost a combined $3.7 billion during the
three months of 1988 -- the largest quarterly loss in
and loans' history.
more than two-thirds of all
and loans remained profitable during the quarter the
958
associations, mostly in Texas (and other
Southwest states, including California), lost a total of $5.1
ion. This loss offset the total earnings of profitable
and loan in the country, $1.4 billion. Texas
alone reported $3.5 billion of the total $5.1
on the quarter.21
Table 1 below summarizes the total bank and savings and
loan failures in California and throughout the nation from 1983
to 1987.
Table 1
BANK AND SAVINGS AND LOAN FAILURES
CALIFORNIA AND NATIONWIDE

and
Loan Failures

Bank Failures
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983

(Source:
Cali

5
2
6
5
4

184
138
120
79
48

12
15

48

49

2

34

1
0

27
53

Cali
State
Savings and Loan

FDIC,

Although
for 1988 were not yet available
press time for this report, as of November 17, 1988, 185
banks and 143 savings and loans had failed nationally during
1988, indicating a leveling-off in bank failures, but an
accelerating crisis for the savings and loan industry.

20 R. Litan, What Should Banks Do?, at p. 101.
21 Sacramento Bee, July 22, 1988, p.
15

ca.

4.

between
dealers,
less
the
ly
the
the
financial
, little
ifornia's
the
and
of new
and
the

22

to

Senate
1

The

could cause serious damage to the state's
industry, there have been
at
few
, outside of the Departments themselves, to ascertain how
the State Banking Department and the Department of Savings and
Loan are performing their statutorily mandated supervisory
duties. This has occurred in spite of the fact that as
deregulation progressed, supervision of institutions became more
rather than less important, because of the increased
opportunities for overextension and outright fraud on the part of
ion officers. This study hopes to make a contribution in
reviewing this important area.
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CALIFORNIA'S FINANCIAL REGULATORY PROCESS

Department
may result
of
state. Only
Department. In
and sound banking
of payment
, and (3) Business
(BIDC0 1 s). The
the State of California,
within the State as
of banks regulated
through 1987.
Table 2
BANKS AND BRANCHES REGULATED BY THE STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT,
1980 -

Branches

Year End
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980

1987

279
287
285
28
273
264
252
223

1716
1685
na
na
na
na
na
na

(Source: State
1
in assets in
supervises 100
66 billion in assets; and 19
companie& and 42 trust departments within supervised banks
holding $107
l
assets.
1987.

2. Funding and Staffing
The
of the state Banking Department are supported
by the state Banking Fund, which is replenished annually by
assessment of banks,
of money orders and travelers
checks, and trust companies; license and application fees; sale
18

and

for

, such as bank

i

The Department is administered by the Superintendent of
Banks, who is appointed by the Governor.
In the 1987-88 Fiscal
Year, the Department has a staff of 182 personnel-years.23 Table
3
zes the supervisory staffing of the department from 1982
1987.
Table 3
NUMBER OF BANK EXAMINERS AND SUPERVISORS, 1982 - 1987

Field
Examiners
staffed
Allocated
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982

118
117
116
116
109
103

Assistant
De:Euties
8
7
7
7
7
7

112
106
108
109
103
97

Regional
De:Euties

Total
Supervisorial
Sta

4
4

4
4
4
4

124
117
119

120
114
108

(Source: state Banking Department and Legislative Analyst)
Table 4 below shows the number and type of examinations
performed by the Department from 1980 - 1987. The Department
examines the operations of foreign banking corporations and trust
companies, as well as performing separate examinations of the
of banks.
From the data below,
roughly
other
banks are
stringently, with examinations

23 Legislative Analyst and The State Banking Department.
"Personnel-years" refers to the total number of full-time
positions allocated to a department,
regardless of how work is
broken down in practice.

19

DEPARTMENT, BY

2 9
2 7
285
286
273
264
252
223

a
1983
1982
19 1
1980

100

147

6
62
6
6
5
52
50
34

17
29
27
30
24
20
22
20

(Source:
3

1987.
11
for 11
Department.
problems in
showing
enforcement
period before
81,
one
1982, over 23 state

2

Table 5
BANK FAILURES, FEDERAL VS. STATE CHARTERED INSTITUTIONS
1983 - 1988 YEAR TO DATE

Calendar
Year

State
Banks

1987
1986
1985
1984
1983

5

2

2

5
1
1
1

6*
5

4

National
Banks

California
Total
7
7
7
6
5

u.s.
Total
184
138
120
79
48

* Does not include one office of a foreign banking corporation
that failed in Canada, necessitating the liquidation of the
California operation by the Superintendent.
(Source: State Banking Department; FDIC)
Table 6
FAILED AND MERGED BANKS REGULATED BY STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT
1983 - 1987

Year
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983

Failed

Merger*

Total

6
3

11

2

8
9
11

5
2

6
5
4

4
7

5

*Merged through regulatory enforcement action
(Source: State Banking Department)
According to the Banking Department, as of February 8, 1988,
there are 45 state-chartered banks considered to be "serious
problem situations" where, "unless corrections are effected, the
bank could fail." The Department indicates that another 58 banks
are considered to be in "less than satisfactory condition,
although not quite as serious." Furthermore, "several" foreign
banking corporations regulated by the Department are considered

21

are

financial
insiders or
present in, the
(and probably
to some form of
to banks
problems that
State Department
reasons
banks'
enforcement actions

The problems
nationally are,
state-chartered
of Banking
instabil
4.

, as

from
relatively
resolution of
this
expenses of the
in a separate
, however, that

24

"Background Paper
11
February 8,

on

Operations
1988, at p. 13

Currency,
Press

1988.

the Nation's
are Inadequate;"
Operations of the u.s.
1988; p. 10.
22

and 1987, the
hours on banking

13 500
7

5. Strategic Plan '88
Overall, the State Banking Department appears to have
clear objectives, substantial understanding of the conditions in
the banking industry and the problems faced by the industry, and
a sound plan for reaching its objectives 1 within the budget
imposed by the Governor and the
The
Department should be commended for its strategic plan, discussed
below. Two key issues for the Banking Department will be whether
they will effectively implement "Strategic Plan 1 88, 11 and whether
it has the resources to adequately supervise the banking
industry, even with the efficient use of resources contemplated
the plan.
Earlier this year, Superintendent of Banks Howard Gould
publicly presented the State Banking Department's "Strategic Plan
'88 --Adapting to a Changing Financial Services Environment."
This is the first long-range plan ever undertaken by the
Department to actively manage change in the financial services
industry.
The plan is realistically based on the assumption
that, in addition to the multitude of changes already brought on
by deregulation, there will be ongoing change -- that the banking
business is no longer the staid and predictable enterprise it
once was, especially when interstate banking begins in 1990.
The strategic plan also anticipates changes in industry
performance, namely continued pressure for banks to remain
profitable in an increasingly competitive environment. Industry
changes will give banks more powers, creating "a need for the
Department to supervise these increased powers effectively." The
plan also considers changes in the California economy, citing
population growth and California's position as a Pacific Rim
finance center.
The strategic plan
s resources
grow as fast as
, and
to develop Department
at a faster pace and
better training to cope
new chal
To
these
s, the Department's
an enumerates four
specific objectives:
1)

The Supervision Object

2)

The Human Resource Objective

27 Letter
to
The
Commission
from
Superintendent of Banks, March 1, 1988, p.1.
23
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2) Department agreement with the FDIC to j
banks having assets of $1 billion or more
reduce examination time;

examine all
further

3) Internal office automation system (on-line by Fall of
1988) •
4) Departmental reorganization plan, which will include a
realignment of workload between the offices, possible
reclassification of certain positions, and restructuring of
the training and consumer complaint sections.31

In order to meet the Department's newly-established human
resources objective, a new hiring strategy is being developed,
and performance reviews will be based upon new and more explicit
standards for each position.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT*
Guided by its new "Strategic Plan 1 88," the Department may
be able to anticipate change and react, while maintaining the
high standards in personnel and performance to regulate banks
during these volatile economic times. The following
recommendations relating to the implementation of the strategic
plan will be of help:
Supervision Objective
RECOMMENDATION 1 - Adequacy of Resources.
Although the Department contemplates efficient and effective
deployment of its resources, it is still the case that since
January 1982, 23 state banks have failed.
In addition,
Superintendent Gould reports that as of February 1988, there are
45 state-licensed "serious problem banks" where, unless
corrections are effected immediately, the banks may fail.
Another 58 banks are in less than satisfactory condition,
although "not quite as serious." Altogether, 37%, more than 1
out of 3 state banks, are in trouble of some kind. At the same
time, superintendent Gould has acknowledged that the Department
is in need of additional personnel, including 14 new examiner
positions. The Legislature and the Department must evaluate
whether even with effective and efficient deployment of
resources, the Department has enough resources to adequately
supervise its licensees.

31 I b'd
1 . , pp. 13-15.
* NOTE: Recommendations 1 - 12 deal with the State Banking
Department, while Recommendations 13 - 20 are addressed to the
Department of Savings and Loan.
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every
troubled
fact
some kind, we

believe that this is an insufficient amount of
Department should examine every one of its
once a year.
nTroubled11 institutions should be examined at least
every six months.
Increasing the frequency of examinations
should help the Department to detect problems earlier, as well as
acting as a deterrent to those who might otherwise attempt fraud
or other misconduct.
Human Resource Objective
The Department has suffered from a turnover of examiners and
auditors. Significantly, 11.2% of all examiners and auditors (14
personnel) left the Department in 1985-86 and 13.8% (17
personnel) left in 1986-87. The Auditor General identified pay
and benefits limitations and a lack of promotional opportunity as
the primary causes for this high turnover. Steps have been taken
to reduce turnover, but the Banking Department cannot attract and
keep top examiner staff until salaries and benefits are
comparable to the competition. Further steps must be taken to do
more than simply reduce turnover. The Department must be able to
offer better inducements than the federal government and remain
within ball-park range of the private banks to lure away the top
examiners and attract top new examiner trainees.
RECOMMENDATION s - Provide Pay Comparable to the Private
sector for Examiners and supervisory staff.
The Department and the Legislature should consider all
appropriate means of providing salaries and benefits to examiners
and supervisory staff comparable to private sector equivalents.
It is worth noting in this regard that there is precedent for the
removal of these positions from civil service pay scales. The
California Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) and the
state Teachers Retirement System (STRS), in efforts to stop the
exodus to the private sector of the top investment managers and
financial analysts who manage these public funds, were successful
in pushing legislation that exempted these personnel from the
state civil service pay scale. The FHLB of San Francisco, faced
with the same problem as PERS and STRS, succeeded in removing its
supervisory personnel from civil service, thereby permitt
higher salaries and better benefits.
Because a number of State
Banking Department personnel have left for employment with the
FHLB of San Francisco, the Legislature and the Department should
consider taking similar steps.
If such an exemption or any other
pay-augmenting measures are enacted, however, with them should
come a new and more stringent performance review system for these
employees, so as to allow continued justification for paying them
higher salaries.
RECOMMENDATION 6 - Personnel Salary Survey.
The Department of Personnel Administration, at the request
of the Legislature, completed a survey in November of 1987
comparing wages, salaries, and benefits of examiner staffs at the
Federal Home Loan Bank and Federal Reserve Bank in San Francisco,
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The Commission recommends that the
be
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maximum participation in the training program.
Infrastructure Objective
RECOMMENDATION 10 - Fraud Unit.
The Department does not have a fraud unit. Two
investigators, who may be given limited peace officer status by
the passage of SB 2272 (Vuich), are currently in the budget for
the upcoming Fiscal Year. These investigators would investigate
various violations of law, including bank fraud, and enforce
various laws administered by the Department. They would also
investigate the backgrounds of persons applying for bank charters
and other licenses issued by the Department. SB 2272 would allow
these investigators to serve arrest warrants and have access to
criminal records -- vital tools if they are to be effective in
preparing cases that the Attorney General or local district
attorneys will be willing to accept for prosecution. The
Commission fully endorses SB 2722, and concurs with the need for
Departmental investigators. However, much more is needed to
effectively combat this serious problem.
In light of the findings that fraud and insider abuse are a
major reason for bank failure, the Department and the Legislature
should work together to establish a special fraud unit,
regardless of whether the investigator positions are funded or
whether they receive peace officer status. The Commission
believes that two investigators are not nearly enough, by
themselves, to effectively address the fraud problem. A fraud
unit, staffed by several full-time investigators, preferably with
peace officer status, should also be staffed with its own
secretarial support services and legal counsel. It is possible
that existing Department resources could be assigned on a
part-time basis to accommodate these needs; if not, the
Legislature should provide the Department
supplemental
resources earmarked for this
It is essential, to reduce
the future cost of institutional failures to Cali
taxpayers, for the Department to have a much better fraud
detection and prevention capability than it has today.
Information Objective
RECOMMENDATION 11 - Focus on Problem Areas.
The Department should focus on the key problem areas in the
banking industry which have been recently reported to be
contributors to bank failure, particularly fraud and misconduct,
in order to identify the types of information that would provide
an early warning of potential failure.
The Department should
then design and implement a strategy for maximizing its access to
this type of information, including the use of investigators,
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DEPARTMENT OF SAVINGS AND LOAN
1. Legal Mandate
The Department of Savings and Loan is responsible for
regulating the activities and examining the financial records of
the state-licensed savings and loan associations in order to
protect the savings and investments of the public.
The
Department's policy statement expands this mandate to include
Department assurance of the "continued financial growth of these
associations consistent with public need and convenience.u33
Table 7 shows the number of savings and loans regulated by the
Department from fiscal year 1982-83 through fiscal year 1987-88.
Table 7

SAVINGS AND LOANS REGULATED BY THE DEPARTMENT, 1982 - 1988
Fiscal Year

State Chartered Savings and Loans

Branches

1987-88
1986-87
1985-86
1984-85
1983-84
1982-83

137
146
153
148
123
106

1295
na
na
na
865
665

(Sources:

Department of Savings and Loan: Legislative Analyst)

Currently there is in excess of $147.9 billion in assets in the
State associations represented above. Associations convert these
funds into residential, consumer and commercial building
development and construction loans.34
2. Funding
The operations of the Department of Savings and Loan are
supported from the Savings Association Special Regulatory Fund,
whose revenues come primarily from an annual assessment of
savings and loans, based upon the association's assets.
These
funds go toward examinations and bank oversight only, and a
contingency reserve for economic uncertainty is maintained. The

33 Letter to The Commission from Shirley Thayer, Department
of Savings and Loan, Senior Staff Counsel, February 18, 1988, p.
2.
34 Governor's Budget, 1988-89, page BTH 61, line 8.
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According to the Legislative
approximately 9% of the Department s
of the annual assessment against the
and Loan Association, which has been placed in receivership by
the FSLIC pending its sale to new investors. The prospective
owners plan to switch to a federal charter, thereby depriving the
Department of American Savings' substantial assessment. Another
large association has expressed interest in changing
charter
from that of a state-chartered savings and loan to that of a
state-chartered bank. The Department's budget thus faces
significant reduction and could be further adversely affected if
the second association above were to exert pressure on the
Department to decrease its assessment.
The scenario in which a California savings and loan changes
charter to either a federal savings and loan or a bank is
becoming more and more common. As savings and loan officers see
fewer benefits from the California state charter, it makes less
and less sense to them to pay the added costs of state regulation
without offsetting gains in the form of broader powers. The
threat of charter-shopping by savings and loan has exacerbated
the funding and staffing problems the Department now faces.
Its
budget needs are being held hostage to regulatory competition.
Industry groups have put forth the argument that regulation
by the state is duplicative. In addition to the Department of
Savings and Loan, associations must be audited by independent
auditors, in-house auditors, and the FSLIC on a regular basis.
Each of those audits concentrates on different aspects of the
association's operations, however, and the fact is that those
institutions choose the state as a regulator, placing the state
under the legal obligation to supervise them on behalf of the
public. To the extent that regulation is necessary, the
associations should be willing to both submit to examinations and
pay for them.
3. Staffing and Examinations
Tables 8 and 9 below indicate that,
1987, the Department
of Savings and Loan employed a total of 83 examiner and
supervisory personnel, amounting to one examinat
person per year.
In contrast, the State
's 116
examiners and assistant deputy exam
completed 177 bank
examinations, 50 foreign banking corporation
ions, and 17
trust company examinations during 1987.
(See Table 4,
"Examinations Performed by the Department of Banking"). These
figures do not suggest that savings and loan examiners are less
productive than bank examiners.
Indeed, the disparity between
the requirements and current difficulty of savings and loan
versus bank examinations make such comparisons of questionable
value. Nonetheless, our intuitive conclusion is that additional
examiners in the Department of Savings and Loan may be needed in
order to increase the frequency and effectiveness of supervision.
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OF SAVINGS AND LOAN EXAMINERS AND SUPERVISORS
1982

1987

17

83
83

15

84

12
15

61
47

13

29

9

EXAMINATIONS PERFORMED BY

1

83 -

BY TYPE OF EXAMINATION

1987

No.
Examinations
Regular
Problem

(Source: State Department

48

35

42

33

52
56

25
23

76

15

and Loan)
the

1983

figures.

1983.
the number of
of problem
indicates that,
being supervised
examinations increasing by
number of examinations
11

rose
more
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performed fell by almost 9 percent, from 91 exams in 1983 to 83
exams in 1987.
According to the 1988-89 Governor's Budget, the Department
estimates that it will perform 131 examinations, utilizing a
total of 333 field visits, in Budget Year 1987-88. This appears
to indicate that the Department plans to examine each
institution under its supervision no more than once a year.
Considering the fact that the industry is in serious condition
by most accounts, it would be prudent for the Department to step
up the frequency and detail of its examinations. The Commission
is concerned that, without hiring additional examiners who
already have some expertise, the Department will not be able to
meet its goals for the year, nor its overall legal mandate.
There is one more factor that should be noted in connection
with extent of the Department's examination staff. A moratorium
by the FSLIC on the licensing of new savings and loan in
California, Texas, and Florida has been in effect since
approximately 1984. The moratorium was reached by agreement
with the Department. The provisions of the ban were that, until
the savings and loan regulatory departments in these states
could hire a sufficient number of examiners to adequately
regulate associations, the FSLIC would not grant insurance to
any new associations, thereby preventing them from being
licensed by the states.
According to the California Department of Savings and Loan
the moratorium is still in effect, although the Department says
it reached the agreed-upon examiner staffing levels some time
ago. Department officials are unaware of the reasons for the
continued ban, and note that the FSLIC has provided insurance to
new associations in Florida and Texas in recent months.
It is unclear why the FSLIC is still not granting insurance
in California (the Department has not been openly critical of
the continued ban), but if indeed one of the Department's
principal objectives is "to assure the continued financial
growth of these associations consistent with public need and
convenience," it appears that in spite of raising the number of
examiners (from 49 in 1984 when the moratorium began, to 66 in
1988), the Department knows it is under pressure and is not
truly capable of effectively regulating any more associations
than currently exists.
4. Institutional Failure Trends in California
Table 10 below summarizes the number of failures of
California chartered savings and loans and total failures
throughout the nation from 1983 through 1987.
It is clear from
these data that California associations are over-represented.
For 1986 and 1987 California failures comprised 28% of the total
national failures of savings and loans.
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Neglected in these discussions is an
l
note: the onset of deregulation failed to
increase in supervision. In fact, as
gained expanded powers, supervision stayed the same or even
decreased, inviting abuses of these powers. A key reason for
the crisis in the industry today is the fact that oversight of
the industry did not increase either quantitatively or
qualitatively during a period when institutional operations were
becoming increasingly complex and perilous.
5. Costs to the state of savings and Loan Association
Failures
The annual costs to the State of savings and loan
association failure are relatively
ificant on the whole,
but as they relate to the total budget of the Department, the
costs become more telling. As represented in Table 11 below,
the total cost, from June 1982 to December 1987, to the
Department of Savings and Loan of the sale, closure, merger or
bailout of insolvent savings and loans, was $3,226,514. This
includes factors such as attorney's fees and consulting fees.
The costs are established from estimates of time spent directly
and indirectly, including costs incurred prior to and work after
as a result of conservatorship or receivership, except that the
costs incurred by the examination section of the Department are
only for the immediate cost related to the takeover (i.e., day
of takeover and time on premises).
Costs of takeovers will, of course, vary depending on the
circumstances and reasons for insolvency. Those takeovers which
required legal actions also require extensive staff time to
produce records, appraisals, and investigation for civil and
criminal court filings.
Some of these costs have extended into
subsequent years and are reported here in the years incurred.
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industry, its mission, and its funding and staffing. The
savings and loan industry is in the midst of difficult times,
and is experiencing far greater difficulty than the banking
industry.
The Department is faced with serious funding limitations,
an increasing number of association failures, and a declining
number of total examinations per year.
In order to address
these ongoing problems, the Commission recommends that the
Department develop two separate strategic plans similar to that
recently completed by the State Banking Department, one based
upon existing budget constraints and one which contemplates
additional resources.
Two plans are necessary because of continuing pressures on
the Governor's budget. These pressures require any state agency
to plan for operations using its existing budget and plan for
the availability of additional resources, should they become
available. The Commission does not suggest a third option,
planning for a decrease in resources, because it is our opinion
that the Department is currently operating at a level below the
minimum it needs to perform its duties adequately.
The Commission suggests utilizing the same type of
organizational perspective developed by the Banking Department
because it is designed well and allows for flexibility in
creating alternative strategies:
o

PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS
Industry Changes
Industry Performance
California Economy
Department Resources

o

SUPERVISION OBJECTIVE

o

HUMAN RESOURCE OBJECTIVE
Hiring Strategy
Compensation Strategy
Promotion Strategy

o

INFRASTRUCTURE OBJECTIVE

o

INFORMATION OBJECTIVE

We have included some recommended strategies to be
considered within each overall objective. With the Department's
expertise, many more will become necessary as a result of the
assessment necessary to create a long-term plan. We discuss our
recommendations in detail below.
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RECOMMENDATION 13 -

New Departmental Revenues.

The Department
presently
receives in order to
carry out its mission. The
Department should seek
alternative sources of
funding. The Legislature and the Department should consider a
number of options for augmenting the Department's funding. The
Legislature could mandate
assessments against the
Department's licensees. or
use the Department of
corporations as a model and channel Department assessments
through the General Fund.
s budgeting mechanism, if
implemented, would
1
to the Department's budget
and permit the
fund the Department according to
regulatory needs, rather
amount of assessments
available to it.
Alternatively,
the franchise tax for
associations, and
should be explored.
offset for assessments
assessments more

securing offsets against
against California-chartered
to the General Fund,
permitted a franchise tax
regulator, making the
savings and loan industry.

RECOMMENDATION 14 - Strategic Plan Within Existing
Resources.
The Strategic Plan 88
by the Banking Department
provides a good model for the
of savings and Loan,
acting within the scope of its current resource levels. Should
there be no change in the Department's funding levels, there
should still be a comprehensive reconsideration of departmental
priorities, acknowledging the regulatory requirements of an
industry in up>.eaval. The Commission will not suggest an
alternative plun for a reduction in departmental resources, as
the current resource levels are below the minimum required for

* NOTE: Recommendations 1 - 12 deal with the State Banking
Department, while Recommendations 13 - 20 are addressed to the
Department of Savings and Loan.
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RECOMMENDATION 15 - Strategic Plan W!th
Resources.

In
meet'
~d~itional

In this second strategic plan, the Department should
evaluate, utilizing current and projected workload information
based upon the most effective regulation, as opposed to the
current situation, where the Department is staffed at the
minimum necessary to carry out the letter of the law. The
present situation in the industry will not allow the Department
to be satisfied with meeting the minimal regulatory standards,
and the mission of the Department, part of which is to assure
continued financial growth of savings and Loan associations,
will not tolerate it. The Department must seek additional funds
in order to be proactive -- to meet the demands of the changing
market -- instead of following its current reactive course.
2. Supervision Objective
RECOMMENDATION 16 - Fraud.
The recent congressional report cited elsewhere in this
report states that fraud and other forms of misconduct were
responsible for at least 80% of savings and loan insolvencies
between January 1984 and June 1987. savings and Loan
Commissioner Crawford participated in these congressional
hearings and is aware of their findings.
Like the state Banking
Department, the Department of savings and Loan should review the
findings of this report in consultation with the Legislature,
and working together, they should implement steps for improving
the Department's ability to detect and respond to fraud,
including establishing a fraud unit as recommended under
Recommendation 19. In addition, the
slature and the
Department should j
there is
and whether
ic
where ci ti ens who
fraudulent
attention of enforcement
are
entitled to a percentage of any proceeds, would be an effective
deterrent in this area.
In addition, some members of the Commission felt strongly
that jail sentences should be mandatory when officers of an
institution are convicted of fraud or misconduct, and that upon
their conviction, officers should also lose their pension and
profit-sharing rights.
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RECOMMENDATION 18 - Depoliticize Savings and Loan
commissioner.
The savings and Loan Commissioner should be protected from
political influence. In our interview with one Commissioner, he
close to the Governor acted
advised of instances
associations. Even
as representatives for
nature
the relationship
without any overt
between the attorney and
Governor made the Commissioner feel
duties. That sense of
vulnerable in carrying out
vulnerability should be
amending current law to
permit the Savings and Loan
•vuG:~, once appointed, to be
removed by a
for
cause. This would mirror
the appointment
of the Currency at
the federal level.
RECOMMENDATION 19 - Joint Examination and Reports With
FHLB.
Presently,
have the resources to
examine associations
of scrutiny now provided by
the Federal Home Loan
Francisco. Rather than carry
out a parallel,
examination, the Department
should carry out j
FHLB of San
Francisco, focusing
the California charter
provides for powers
to a federal
Association. Thus
Loan examiners
could focus on:
(1)
activities, including
compliance with by
with
service corporation
agreement that is
service corporation of a
California-Chartered
and (2) the broader powers
available to at
of consumer and commercial
lending. The Lepartment should also focus on key problem areas
within associations or
problem associations through
joint examinations.
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3. Human Resources Objective
RECOMMENDATION 20 - Personnel Reforms.
The same recommendations made earlier regarding the hiring,
compensation, training, and career counseling of the Department
of Banking are equally applicable to the Department of Savings
and Loan.
4. Infrastructure Objective
RECOMMENDATION 21 - Fraud Unit.
The recommendations identified earlier regarding the
establishment of a fraud unit in the Department of Banking are
equally applicable to the Department of Savings and Loan.
Despite the widespread nature of the fraud problem in the
savings and loan industry, the Department does not have a fraud
unit. The Department and the Legislature should work together
to establish a special fraud unit, staffed by several full-time
investigators, preferably with peace officer status. This unit
should also be staffed with its own secretarial support services
and legal counsel. It is possible that existing Department
resources could be assigned on a part-time basis to accommodate
these needs; if not, the Legislature should provide the
Department with supplemental resources earmarked for this
purpose. It is essential, to reduce the future cost of
institutional failures to California taxpayers, for the
Department to have a much better fraud detection and prevention
capability than it has today.
5. Information Objective
RECOMMENDATION 22 - Additional Information.
In addition to the recommendations previously set forth for
the Department of Banking, particularly the recommendation
concerning forms and questionnaires on management policies and
procedures, the Department of Savings and Loan should consider
whether it has enough information on potential problem areas,
including service corporations. We recommend that regulators
get monthly computer data from institutions so that dangers can
be spotted more quickly, and that automation be more thoroughly
employed throughout the Department's operations.
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COMBINING THE BANKING AND SAVINGS AND LOAN REGULATORY
FUNCTIONS

The notion of combining the banking and savings and loan
regulatory functions was proposed in California as early as
1976, by then Business, Transportation and Housing Secretary
Donald Burns. The "Department of Financial Institutions," as it
was to have been called, would have also overseen credit unions
and other lending-trust firms. Four years before deregulation
made this a top consideration in many states and the federal
government, combining financial regulatory agencies was
vehemently opposed by industry trade associations.
One of the prime reasons for the proposal, Burns said at
the time, is that "sometimes, with regulatory agencies, they
tend to be co-opted by the industries they were designed to
regulate. This has happened in many states and it may have
happened here in California".38 In addition, he indicated that,
because of competition, banks, savings and loans, and other
financial institutions are "under tremendous pressure to become
alike," and government has to "be ready for the future".39
The future arrived in 1980, in the form of deregulation. Since
that time, there have been efforts, many successful, at the
state level to consolidate the functions of banking and savings
and loan regulators into one state agency.
However, in one of the most comprehensive studies
undertaken on the subject of modernizing financial regulatory
institutions, the State of New York's DeWind Commission
recommended in a 1984 report that financial institutions be
regulated by function -- that the separate activities of
multi-service firms should be supervised and regulated by the
appropriate state authority depending on the nature of the
activity, rather than by the charter the institution holds.
"Thus," they concluded, "the Commission firmly believes that the
insurance agency activities in which banks may be authorized to
engage should be supervised by the Insurance Department," and so
on.
At the federal level, Vice President George Bush chaired
the "Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services," which
recommended consolidation by eliminating the FDIC's role in
examining and regulating state non-member banks. The Task Group
recommended creating a new "Federal Banking Agency" within the
Treasury Department, incorporating the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currenc}. These recommendations have not been
implemented.

38 Sacramento Bee, February 8, 1976, p. A1.
39 Ibid.
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In recent months, there has been cons
debate
and discussion regarding the consolidation of the two federal
insurance funds, the FDIC and the FSLIC, primarily because of
the weakness of the savings and loan fund, but also because of
the blurring of institutional lines between banks and savings
and loan.
This debate has again raised the question of
consolidation of the California state financial regulators.
The Commission believes that the question of consolidating
the state Banking Department and the Department of Savings and
Loan should remain a topic for further consideration and study.
However, we believe it would be premature at this stage to
recommend consolidation because there remain substantial
differences in the way the two Departments use and train
examiners and in the regulatory structure governing each
Department's functions and operations.
In addition, the
administrative cost savings potential may not presently justify
the consolidation.
Nevertheless, the entire area of regulation of financial
institutions should have a higher profile in state government.
The Governor and his administration must make this a high
priority and assure that energy and resources are focused on the
very serious problems outlined in this report. While merging
the Departments might not make sense at this point, it is vital
that their regulatory needs be recognized and met if the state
is to effectively respond to the very serious problems present
in California's financial industry today.
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NOTES ON METHODOLOGY

In completing this report, the Commission utilized a number
of sources, conducting hearings, interviewing observers of the
Departments of State Banking and Savings and Loan, and making
written inquiries of the Departments.
Witnesses attending meetings of the Subcommittee on
Institutions and offering their insights on
California's financial regulatory process included former
Secretaries of Business, Transportation and Housing Don Burns,
Richard Silberman, and Lynn Schenk, as well as Senate Majority
Leader Barry Keene.
Pro bono consultants to the Commission John B. McNeece III
and A. Vincent Siciliano, along with Commission staff, conducted
interviews with the following individuals: Howard Gould,
Superintendent of Banks; William J. Crawford, Savings and Loan
Commissioner; Dean Cannon, President, California League of
savings and Loans; Gus Bonta, Executive Director, California
Bankers' Association; and Michael Patriarca, Director, Agency
Group, Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco.
The Commission is grateful for the cooperation of the State
Banking Department and the Department of savings and Loan.
Responses to the Commission's extensive written inquiries were
supplied by Steven suchil, Counsel and Legislative Coordinator
of the State Banking Department, and Shirley Thayer, Senior
Staff Counsel to the Department of Savings and Loan.
Finally, the Commission gained valuable insights on
personnel issues within the Departments from the September 1987
report of the Auditor General entitled "A Review of Examiner,
Auditor, and Appraiser Attrition in the State Banking
Department, The Department of Savings and Loan, the Department
of Corporations, and the Department of Real Estate."
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